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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA),' a proposed amendment to the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 seeks to expedite the process by which
unions are recognized and, thereby, to increase union membership. This aim
is urgent, since union membership has declined precipitously since the 1980s. 3
Among its other objectives, the proposed act promotes card checks4 as a viable
alternative to secret ballot elections, 5 the current statutory mechanism for
union recognition. Under the EFCA, an employer would be required to
recognize a union upon a showing of signed authorization cards from a
majority of the collective bargaining unit.6
Union recognition by card checks is practically immediate, whereas secret
ballot elections occur, on average, forty-two days from the National Labor
Relations Board's (NLRB) approval of the election petition.7 During this time
lag, the employer may engage in anti-union campaigning and may commit
unfair labor practices, such as discriminatorily discharging known union
supporters, in an often successful attempt to intimidate employees and quash
the union.' The EFCA attempts to eliminate this campaign period and those
coercive tactics that would infringe upon workers' statutory right to join a
union.9
This Note will compare union recognition in the United States with that of
Canada, where card checks are the norm in half of the provinces, and with the
recognition system of the United Kingdom, which promotes voluntary
1 Employee Free Choice Act, S. 842, 109th Cong. (2005).
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2005).
3 In 2005, 12.5% of American workers were unionized. In the private sector, the rate falls
to 7.8%. Union membership has remained stable since 2004, but is nearly half of what it had
been twenty years ago. BUREAU OFLABOR STAT., UNION MEMBERS IN 2005, at 1 (Jan. 20,2006),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
4 Under a card check agreement, an employer will "voluntarily recognize the union if a
majority of employees sign authorization forms or 'cards.' " American Rights at Work, Card
Check Q&A, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/takeaction/efca/efca-q-a.cfin (last visited
Mar. 3, 2006).
' Employees, or the union seeking to represent them, must first file a petition with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) indicating that at least 30% of the bargaining unit have
signed union authorization cards. Once the NLRB deems the bargaining unit appropriate, the
NLRB will authorize an election by secret ballot. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 159.
6 S. 842 § 2(a). See 29 U.S.C. § 159(b), for statutory limitations on the appropriate
bargaining unit.
7 NLRB General Counsel Rosenfeld's Response to Practice and Procedure Questions, 83
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-4 (Apr. 30, 2004).
' See James J. Brudney, NeutralityAgreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832-33 (2005).
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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recognition over secret ballot elections. This Note will argue that, while card
checks are more conducive to employees' free choice in their decision to join
a union than secret ballot elections, based on the examples of Canada and the
United Kingdom, card check legislation alone is unlikely to increase union
membership rates. Part II provides a historical perspective on the need for
unionization and the current climate of union decline in the United States, and
describes recent efforts to revive the Labor Movement. Part II also examines
the current state of union recognition in the United States and evaluates the
EFCA's intended effects. Part III analyzes fundamental objections to card
checks. Part IV compares union recognition in the United States to that of
Canada and the United Kingdom, taking into account union density and wage
differentials. Part V considers other means of increasing union membership
that, alone, may be more effective than card checks or that may supplement
card check legislation.
II. FOR CARD CHECKS
A. State ofthe Unions: Their Persisting Significance and Efforts to Save Them
It was not so long ago that the typical workday was ten hours long and the
typical workweek was six days.'" Perhaps things have not changed much in
this respect for overworked Americans. However, the conditions under which
Americans work have changed dramatically. Wage and hour laws stipulate
minimum wages and maximum hours, and provide extra compensation for
overtime." Because of the prevalence of worker's compensation systems, it
is no longer an accepted practice for courts to deny damages to an injured
worker on the theory that the worker accepted the risk of injury or death
simply by going to work. 2 Children are no longer allowed to work, whereas
at the turn of the twentieth century they were employed by the hundreds of
thousands, often in the most dangerous industries. 3 Safety and health
conditions have improved drastically, so that the workplace horrors
10 AM. SOC. HISTORY PROJECT, THE CITY UNIVERSITY OFNEW YORK, WHO BUILT AMERICA?
WORKING PEOPLE AND THE NATION'S ECONOMY, POLmCS, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY, SINCE 1887,
at 35 (2000) (describing working conditions in the late 1800s).
" Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2005).
12 AM. SOC. HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 10, at 36.
13 Id. at 222 (stating that "[i]n 1900, more than a quarter of a million children under age
fifteen were working in mines, mills and factories").
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exemplified by the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire of 191114 need never
occur again."
If not for unions and the reform movements they engendered, these changes
would not have been effected. For example, the Knights of Labor assailed
child labor, a cause taken up by progressives and reformers in the early
1900s.'6 Also, following the Triangle fire, Samuel Gompers, then president of
the American Federation of Labor (AFL), was named to the Factory
Commission that was established after the fire. The Commission sponsored
fifty-six reform laws, most of which were passed, thus improving the wages
and the health and safety of New York factory workers. 7
At the end of the nineteenth century, these labor reform issues were in
direct opposition to the interests of management:
The harsh conditions of life and labor in the emerging industrial
capitalist economy-long hours, child labor, payment in scrip,
and unsafe workplaces-all enhanced corporate profits.
Deteriorating working conditions and growing powerlessness
engendered bitterness among working people. Workers sought
ways to improve their circumstances under the new industrial
order, while employers tried to make the system even more
productive and profitable."
This struggle survives today, even in the midst of union decline. Employers
resist unions because unions demand better wages and benefits, which inhibit
corporate profits.' 9 In the United States, the wages of unionized workers are
"' Id. at 207. One hundred forty-six garment workers, most of them young immigrant
women, died in a fire when the exits were "locked or blocked by foremen fearful that workers
would sneak out to rest or leave with stolen needles and thread." Id. For a detailed account of
the fire and the subsequent criminal trial in which the factory owners were acquitted, see DAVID
VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2003).
"5 This is not to say that workplace disasters no longer occur. In January 2006, fourteen
miners died in two West Virginia coal mines, both of which had been cited for numerous safety
violations. Editorial, Better Safety for Coal Miners, DENVER POST, Jan. 24, 2006, at B06,
available at 2006 WLNR 1387953. Neither mine was unionized. Press Release, United Mine
Workers of America, Statement of United Mine Workers of America President Cecil Roberts on
the Tragedy at the Sago Mine (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.umwa.org/pressreleases/
pressmain.shtml; CNN LIVE SATURDAY, Jan. 21, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1178265.
16 AM. Soc. HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 10, at 222.
7Id. at 227.
'8 Id. at 36-37.
'9 Unionized workers, however, tend to be more productive, counterbalancing their higher
costs. Additionally, unionized workforces tend to be more stable, providing savings on
recruitment and training. See Noam Chomsky, Lies of Our Times (June 14, 1994), available at
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28% higher than those of nonunion workers.2° Unionized workers are also five
times as likely to have a secure pension plan.2' Whereas 50% of nonunion
workers have health insurance coverage, 80% of unionized workers are
covered.22
Furthermore, unions provide workers a voice for settling grievances, along
with an opportunity to organize for bargaining and political actions.23 Unions
afford their members dignity, community and a sense of empowerment over
their lives and livelihood, of which work is so much a part.24
Historically, employers have also resisted unions because the sense of
empowerment they engender threatens employer control of the workplace and,
perhaps even more alarming, threatens to affect social change. 25  Not
surprisingly, unions were enticed to relinquish much of their intrinsic power.
During the 1930s and '40s, the Labor Movement concentrated on higher
wages, while bargaining away job control.26 This bargain proved to be a bad
one for the Labor Movement and for workers in general when, during the
1980s and '90s, an increasing reliance on technology, which reduced the need
for workers, and an increasingly global economy applied further pressure on
profit-making and provided incentives for industrial migration.27 Ultimately,
these "union concessions . . . resulted in lower living standards for many
Americans. '28
Lower living standards are becoming commonplace at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. "[M]ore than three years into the economic recovery,
U.S. workers' hourly wages continue to decline when adjusted for inflation
with little hope of a dramatic turnaround anytime soon. ' ,29 Despite relatively
high consumer spending, the average growth in wages of U.S. employees fell
below 3% from September 2003 to September 2004.30 This decline in real
http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/loot9406-industry-vs-labor.html.
20 151 CONG. REc. E705 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. George Miller).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 AM. Soc. HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 10, at 431.
24 See id. at 447-48.
25 See Chomsky, supra note 19 ("Freedom and democracy are even less tolerable in the
workplace than in the larger society, under reigning values.").
26 STANLEY ARONOWTZ ,& WILLIAM DIFAzIO, THE JOBLESS FUTuRE: Sci-TECH AND THE
DOGMA OF WORK 23 (1994).
27 See id. at 24.
28 Id.
29 Barbara Rose, Are Days of Big Raises Gone For Good?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 9,
2005, at R1.
30 Id.
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wages is attributed to a sluggish recovery from the 2001 recession, to
globalization and to "the declining influence of trade unions."'"
Since the early 1990s, when the Republican sweep of Congress caused the
revitalization of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO),32 the Labor Movement has struggled to augment its
waning political and economic influence. Although the AFL-CIO has since
regained a high profile, union membership continued to decline through the
'90s and into the new millennium.33 Consequently, in the summer of 2005,
several unions, including the Services Employees International Union and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO.34
These dissenting unions, representing six million members,35 have formed
a new coalition, the Change to Win Federation, which seeks to reform the
policies and strategies of the AFL-CIO.36 Among their proposals, Change to
Win has called for the AFL-CIO to direct no less than half of its budget to
organizing campaigns; to provide a larger budget for aggressive multi-union
campaigns against large corporations, such as Wal-Mart; to increase diversity
of membership; and to increase efforts toward global unionization.37 It
remains to be seen whether this schism will ultimately destroy the Labor
Movement or rebuild it.38
What is without question, however, is that unions are increasingly relying
on card checks in their efforts to raise membership.39 The AFL-CIO estimates
that 150,000 to 200,000 new members are enlisted each year by card checks,
as opposed to 70,000 through NLRB secret ballot elections.40 To increase
union membership overall, the AFL-CIO launched a major effort in support of
31 Id.
32 AM. Soc. HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 10, at 770 (stating that, in 1994, insurgent union
officials successfully challenged a sitting AFL or AFL-CIO president for the first time in over
a hundred years).
3 See supra note 3.
3 See Steven Greenhouse, Four Major Unions Plan to Boycott A.F.L.-C.I.O. Event, N.Y.
TMES, July 25, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 11620783.
" Change to Win, What We Stand For, http://www.changetowin.org (last visited Mar. 3,
2006).
36 Change to Win, Restoring the American Dream Proposal, http://www.changetowin.org/
pdf/AmericanDream.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
37 Id.
31 See Steven Greenhouse, Breakaway Unions Start New Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2005, at A17, available at 2005 WLNR 15264129 ("[W]e are rebuilding the labor movement,
but this time we are building it right." (quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters
President, James P. Hoffa)).
" Aaron Bernstein, Can This Man Save Labor?, Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 2004, at 86.
40 Id.
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the EFCA as a means to statutorily guarantee the predominance of card
checks.4
B. Campaigns or Card Checks: The EFCA Challenge to Current Law
The current state of labor law in the United States does not provide
sufficient protection of workers' statutory right to freely choose union
representation42 because it facilitates employer anti-union behavior.43 The
EFCA is an effort to bolster that right by virtually eliminating the employer
anti-union campaign.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA states that "[r]epresentatives designated or
selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees.., shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees ...
for the purposes of collective bargaining." The NLRA, therefore, does not
mandate a secret ballot election in order to certify a union as the designated
collective bargaining representative of the unit.45 Yet, the secret ballot election
has become the preferred method of the NLRB.46 Additionally, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that an employer has the right to withhold recognition
of a union, regardless of a possible bad faith intention, when faced with
authorization cards from a majority of the bargaining unit, and can insist on
returns from a secret ballot election as proof of majority support.4 7
The union selection process in the United States has been described as "an
elaborate formal procedure for the representation contest." 48 The contest
begins only if the union can first obtain a showing of interest from 30% of the
bargaining unit, proof of which is shown by signed authorization cards.49 Once
the union has obtained a sufficient showing of interest, the union files a
petition for election with the NLRB.50 The Board then "investigates the
41 See id.
42 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2005).
13 See generally Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1775 (1983) (arguing for an upheaval
of the NLRA because its remedies fail to protect workers' rights to collective bargaining).
4 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (emphasis added).
05 A bill that would require a secret ballot election prior to union recognition has been
introduced in Congress. Secret Ballot Protection Act, S. 1173, 109th Cong. (2005).
" Sheila Murphy, Comment, A Comparison of the Selection ofBargaining Representatives
in the United States and Canada: Linden Lumber, Gissel and the Right to Challenge Majority
Status, 10 Comp. LAB. L.J. 65, 70 (1988).
" Linden Lumber Div., Summer& Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974).
48 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1775.
41 Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(A).
"o Weiler, supra note 43, at 1775. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1).
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union's petition, defines the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit, decides
whether the conditions for a valid election have been satisfied, and, if they
have, conducts a secret ballot vote among the eligible employees." 5 Typically,
there is a two-month gap between the filing of the election petition and the
actual vote.52 During this interval, both the union and the employer campaign
vigorously to gamer the support of the collective bargaining unit.53
Current U.S. labor law, however, provides the employer an inequitable
amount of access to the employees to affect their vote, a grant of power that
has been consistently augmented by the courts.54 During the anti-union
campaign, the employer
will emphasize to its workers how risky and troubled life might
be in the uncharted world of collective bargaining: the firm might
have to tighten up its supervisory and personnel practices and
reconsider existing, expensive special benefits; the union would
likely demand hefty dues, fines, and assessments, and might take
the employees out on a long and costly strike with no guarantee
that there would bejobs at the end if replacements had been hired
in the meantime; if labor costs and labor unrest became too great,
the employer might have to relocate.55
If this line of attack does not sway the workforce, the employer may resort
to discharging known union supporters, an unfair labor practice in violation of
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 6 Such discharges have "the immediate effect of
rendering these union supporters unable to vote-a consequence that by itself
"' Weiler, supra note 43, at 1775. See 29 U.S.C. § 159.
52 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1777.
13 Id. at 1777-78.
" See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1945) (holding that
an employer policy prohibiting employees from soliciting for the union on work time is
presumptively valid); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that
nonemployee union organizers may only gain access to the employer's premises in the rare
occasion where "the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by
nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels"); Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (applying Babcock to reverse the Board's order that
Lechmere's prohibition of nonemployee union organizers on their premises was unlawful).
" Weiler, supra note 43, at 1778. For a first-hand account of employer campaign and delay
tactics during the union recognition process, see Field Hearing on Employee Free Choice Act
Before the Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Eileen Connelly, Executive Director, Pennsylvania
State Council for the Service Employees International Union), available at http://appropriations.
senate.gov/subcommittees/record.cfm?id=224140.
56 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
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might tip the balance in a close election."57 Discriminatory discharges also
send a clear message to the remaining employees, who may value the
constancy of their paychecks over the possibility of union representation. 8
Regardless of the illegality of discriminatory discharges, employers
continue the practice because the remedies provided under the NLRA are
ineffective. 9 Remedies are generally limited to reinstatement and back pay.6°
After running a cost benefit analysis, the employer may decide that paying the
penalties is more beneficial to the company than sustaining the cost of
unionization.6  Furthermore, redress is often delayed.62  Typically, the
remaining employees will not see labor law enforced before they go to the
polls. The illegal discharges will have effectively chilled unionization fervor.63
The potency of illegal discharges is confirmed by the frequency with which
they occur.' In 2004, 9,294 unfair labor practice charges were filed against
employers for "alleged illegal discharge or other discrimination against
employees" in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 65  This number
amounts to nearly half of the cumulative 19,946 unfair labor practice charges
against employers that were filed with the NLRB.66 To compare, in 1980,
8(a)(3) violations amounted to only 39% of all charges filed against
employers.67 While the total number of charges against employers has
decreased by 8% from 2003, 8(a)(3) violations comprise "the majority of all
charges against employers., 68  Thus, employers more frequently resort to
illegal discharge as a weapon against union representation in the workplace.
Given these facts, the EFCA is justified in seeking to restrain employer
anti-union conduct by virtually eliminating the campaign period in which these
discharges occur. Furthermore, a 2001 study found that card check agreements
" Weiler, supra note 43, at 1778 (footnote omitted).
58 Id.
" Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the
NLRA andRLA, 2 EMP. RTs. &EMP. POL'Y J. 317, 343 (1998).
0 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1788.
61 See id. at 1789-91 (discussing the inadequacy of backpay awards under the NLRA).
62 In 2004, it took NLRB Regional Offices an average of eighty-seven days to issue a
complaint from the date a meritorious charge was filed. 69 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (2005),
available at www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared-files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/2004%20Whole
AnnualReduced.pdf [hereinafter NLRB ANN. REP.]. If an enforcement proceeding or an appeal
is pursued, it may take several years to obtain an order of reinstatement and back pay. Morris,
supra note 59, at 338.
63 See Morris, supra note 59, at 338.
64 Id. at 317 (stating that discriminatory discharges have reached "epidemic proportions").
65 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 62, at 7.
66 id,
67 Weiler, supra note 43, at 1780.
68 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 62, at 7.
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reduce the number of unfair labor practices that may coerce an employee into
voting against a union.69 According to the authors, card check agreements
"reduced the use of illegal tactics such as discharges and promises of benefits,
as well as the supervisory one-on-one campaigns that are destructive of
relationships and emotionally traumatizing. These findings would appear to
bolster the case for card check as public policy."70
The EFCA guarantees card check recognition by proposing to amend
section 9(c) of the NLRA, instructing the Board that, upon confirmation of
authorization cards signed by a majority of the bargaining unit, it "shall not
direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the
representative."71 The employer would be required to recognize the designated
union as the bargaining representative without resorting to a secret ballot
election.
While the primary focus of this Note is the proposed card check legislation,
the EFCA also requires employers to meet with the union to negotiate the first
collective bargaining agreement,72 and provides for injunctions against illegal
discharges or threats against workers involved in union activities.73 The EFCA
also increases the penalties for unfair labor practices committed by employers
to triple the amount of back pay owed the illegally discharged worker, plus a
civil penalty up to twenty thousand dollars for each unfair labor practice
committed.74
The purpose of the EFCA, according to Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
sponsor of the bill, is to ensure that workers "are free to join a union," a right,
he says, that "is denied in our modem society, because hard-line corporate
managers succeed in denying a fair choice by workers."75 The EFCA offers
employees a free choice by supporting card checks and, in doing so, by
virtually eliminating the employer anti-union campaign.
69 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check
Agreements, 55 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 42, 57 (2001).
70 Id.
71 S. 842, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005).
72 Id. § 3. In 2004, there were 9,130 refusal to bargain charges filed against employers.
NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 62, at 7.
71 S. 842, § 4(a).
74 Id. § 4(b).
71 149 CONG. REc. S15805 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy).
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IH. AGAINST CARD CHECKS: EMPLOYERS NOT GETIrING A FAIR SAY?
There are two fundamental objections to the adoption of a card check
recognition process.76 The first objection contends that authorization cards are
an unreliable barometer of an employee's decision to join the union because
the cards are not anonymous; therefore, the signer may feel peer pressure to
join the union or may not fully understand the consequences of signing the
card." The second maintains that this form of union recognition deprives
employers of an opportunity to share their side of the story; since the
employees are inadequately informed, the cards do not reflect the free choice
of the employees.78
In regard to the first objection, measures may be taken to mitigate concerns
regarding coercion and lack of comprehension. For instance, the NLRB could
retain authority to review situations in which there was a high likelihood of
peer coercion.7 9 To ensure that the worker fully understands the consequences
of signing an authorization card, the worker could be required to apply for
union membership and to pay an application fee upon signing the card. Also,
since there is no election, the NLRB might require approval by a supermajority
of the bargaining unit.8" The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
does not ask for recognition unless it has secured authorization cards from 65%
of the bargaining unit." Therefore, a requirement for approval by 65% of the
bargaining unit might be a more accurate benchmark for mandating
recognition.
76 Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 435 (2002).
" See id. at 436 (citing Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation
Election Outcome: An EmpiricalAssessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's
Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 87, 120 (1984) (finding a 12.5% decrease in union support
claimed on authorization cards as compared to the actual votes in secret ballot elections)).
78 JuLIus G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 134
(1976). See also Murphy, supra note 46, at 91; Befort, supra note 76, at 435. For a cogent
response to critics who claim that card checks are unlawful, see Brudney, supra note 8, at 844-
63.
" Currently, the NLRB may reject authorization cards "based on sufficient showings of
misrepresentation, coercion, or improper promise of benefits." Brudney, supra note 8, at 860
(footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, Burlington Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 974, 976 (4th
Cir. 1982); Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 270, 277-81 (1973)).
80 These three measures are taken by some of the Canadian provincial labor boards to ensure
the accuracy of card check. Befort, supra note 76, at 436.
a' International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Election Process, http://www.ibew.org/
eworkers/organize/electprocess.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
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Steps may also be taken to reduce the possibility that the cards themselves
are unclear and misleading. For example, a uniform authorization card created
and distributed by the NLRB would remove the potential for misinterpretation
of the cards.8 2 Thus, the first objection may be adequately addressed.
The second objection to card checks, that they do not allow employers to
present their side of the story, is more suspect. First, based solely on their
familiarity with the employer's daily practices and policies, employees are
more than adequately informed of an employer's position on the terms and
conditions of employment.8 3 Second, there is no statutory safeguard that
would hold an employer to its campaign promises, whereas the union can be
decertified under section 9(c) of the NLRA' should it fail to fulfill the
employees' expectations." Third, as stated above, current U.S. labor law does
not provide the union equitable access to the employees for effective
campaigning. 6 Fourth, employee free choice is questionable when, during
campaigns prior to secret ballot elections, employers rely on unfair labor
practices, especially on the illegal discharge of known union supporters.87 As
one scholar has pointed out, "[t]his objection would have more validity if
representation campaigns truly focused on a respectful exchange of
information. But, this certainly is not the case in the one in four campaigns
during which an unlawful discharge of a union supporter occurs. Even lawful
campaigns abound in misinformation and intimidation., 88
Finally, a study by Getman, Goldberg and Herman supports the validity of
card checks as a measure of employee free choice.89 Specifically, the study
found that 72% of those who signed authorization cards voted for the union
and that 79% of those who did not sign cards voted against the union.9" This
data supports the notion that the majority of those who sign authorization cards
truly desire union representation. 9
82 Murphy, supra note 46, at 94.
83 Id. at 92 ("The employer's past actions may be a truer indication of his intentions than
promises of future conduct.").
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000).
85 Murphy, supra note 46, at 92.
86 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87 See discussion supra Part II.B.
88 Befort, supra note 76, at 435.
89 GETMANETAL., supra note 78, at 132 ("Card-signing is an accurate indicator of employee
choice at the time the card is signed.").
90 Id. at 133.
9' See Murphy, supra note 46, at 82 (finding support in the Getman study for the Canadian
labor boards' belief that signed authorization cards reflect the employees' genuine desire for
union representation).
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Unless stricter remedies are enacted to deter employers from committing
unfair labor practices during recognition campaigns, and unless U.S. labor law
is otherwise devoid of employer favoritism in terms of access rights, employer
campaigns do not provide an opportunity for employees to be fairly informed.
The effect of eliminating the campaign via card checks, therefore, does not
deprive employees of their freedom to choose union representation.
Considering the protection card checks offer against intimidation and undue
delay by employers in the recognition process, and considering the remedies
available to eliminate the possibility of coercion and ambiguity in the card
check process, these two objections should be disregarded.
IV. CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN COMPARISON
A. Union Recognition in Canada
In contrast to the lengthy and detailed American process, the Canadian
method of union recognition is more streamlined.92 In half of the provinces,
the preferred method of union recognition is by card checks.93 In these
provinces, employees are required to pay a union initiation fee and to fill out
a union membership application at the time they sign the authorization cards.94
These measures ensure that employees fully understand the consequences of
signing the cards.95 The labor boards in these provinces presume that the
signing of the authorization cards by the majority of the collective bargaining
unit is a strong indication of union support in the workplace.96
When compared to secret ballot elections, the immediacy of the union
recognition process in these provinces is striking. This sense of urgency is
attributable to the rationale "that representation campaigns should be avoided
because of their negative effects on the selection process. The campaigns, it
92 Elaine Bernard, The Divergent Paths of OrganizedLabor in the UnitedStates and Canada
4, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/eb/canusa.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) ("It is
generally conceded that the organizing and recognition (certification) process is somewhat easier
in Canada than in the U.S. [sic] - the processes is [sic] much faster, and there are stronger legal
sanctions against employer interference.").
" Gerald Mayer, Congressional Research Service, Domestic Social Policy Division, Labor
Union Recognition Procedures: Use of Secret Ballots and Card Checks 14 (May 23, 2005),
available at http://www.workinglife.org/FOL/pdf/CRS%20may/202005 %20reportcardcheck.
pdf.
" Murphy, supra note 46, at 82.
95 Id.
96 Id. The labor boards "generally retain discretion to order an election if the cards were
collected under circumstances that draw their accuracy into question." Befort, supra note 76,
at 436.
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is believed, frustrate the employees' choice because they often become 'dirty'
and legal control has been found inadequate to prevent unfair labor
practices."97 This rationale is reflected in the EFCA and its purpose to mitigate
the efficacy of anti-union campaigns by promoting card checks in place of
ballots.98
B. Union Recognition in the United Kingdom
The current British system of union recognition incorporates aspects of
both the American and Canadian systems. Like the U.S. system, there is a
statutory provision for ballot elections. Yet, like the Canadian system, the
British system provides for automatic recognition upon a showing of support
for the union by a majority of the bargaining unit.
Prior to the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979, the
1970s saw the passage of decidedly pro-Labor legislation in the United
Kingdom.99 The 1974 Trade Union and Labor Relations Act'00 and the
Employment Protection Act of 1975,01 for example, withdrew protections for
workers discharged because they were not members of the union, thus
strengthening the closed shop, or the union membership agreement (UMA). "2
This legislation resulted in the extension of the closed shop to nearly five
million U.K. workers in 1980."3
In response, Thatcher's Conservative Government platform promised union
reform, which was promptly carried out upon her election. "4 The Employment
Act 1980'05 invalidated existing statutory recognition procedures and required
secret ballots for new UMAs, which would only be approved if 80% of those
97 Murphy, supra note 46, at 82. This reasoning also resonates in the accelerated recognition
schemes espoused by four of the remaining provinces. In these provinces, an election must be
held within five to seven days following the filing of an election petition. See Brudney, supra
note 8, at 879.
9' See discussion supra Part II.B.
9' John T. Addison & W. Stanley Siebert, Recent Changes in the Industrial Relations
Framework in the UK, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 416 (John T. Addison
& Claus Schnabel eds., 2003).
0 Trade Union and Labor Relations Act, 1974, c. 52 (Eng.).
101 Employment Protection Act, 1975, c. 71 (Eng.).
102 Addison & Siebert, supra note 99, at 416. The closed shop and the union membership
agreement are synonymous. A closed shop is a workplace in which "union membership is a
condition of employment." Claus Schnabel, Determinants of Trade Union Membership, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 16 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds.,
2003).
103 Addison & Siebert, supra note 99, at 416.
104 Id. at417.
' Employment Act, 1980, c. 42 (Eng.).
[Vol. 34:689
CHECKS AND BALLOTS
entitled to vote were in favor.10 6 The Employment Act 1982107 required all
UMAs to be approved every five years by 80% of those entitled to vote, or by
85% of those actually voting."' These approval thresholds are striking since
they are much more demanding than a simple majority standard. Hence, union
security and recognition became more difficult to obtain than in the years
prior.
Union membership declined drastically during this period of anti-union
legislation. In 1979, 53% of British workers were union members, but by
1999, this number had declined to 28%.9 Although not willing to place all
the blame on the inception of these laws," 0 some scholars concede that there
has been a "downturn in union recognition," and that the "role of the law is
direct here," especially when the laws are considered in the context of the
encompassing agenda of anti-union reform."' While it has been said that the
Blair Administration has only "tinkered at the margins' ' 12 of the Conservative
labor agenda, it has also been noted that there is currently a "perceptible
change in the industrial legal temperature, and a shift in the balance against the
employer.""' Furthermore, when Blair reinstated the statutory recognition
process eroded by Thatcher, union membership rose for the first time in twenty
years, although modestly." 
4
On June 6, 2000, the Employment Relations Act 1999 .5 was enacted in the
United Kingdom. It applies to employers of more than twenty workers and
permits voluntary recognition at the employer's discretion. "6 If the employer
rejects or ignores the union's request for recognition, the union can then apply
for recognition to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC)." 7 Like the
NLRB, the CAC determines whether the proposed bargaining unit is
appropriate and whether the union has obtained the majority support of that
unit."8 Recognition is granted automatically if the CAC is convinced that a
106 Addison & Siebert, supra note 99, at 418.
107 Employment Act, 1982, c. 46 (Eng.).
,08 Addison & Siebert, supra note 99, at 418.
109 Id. at 422.
1. Id. In particular, the authors withhold some of the blame because other industrialized
nations have experienced "precipitous declines in union membership without corresponding
changes in their legal environment." Id.
111 Id.
112 JOHN BOWERS, Q.C. ET AL., THE LAW OF INDusTRL4L ACTION AND TRADE UNION
RECOGNITION 2 (2004).
113 Id. at 3.
114 Addison & Siebert, supra note 99, at 444.
.1. Employment Relations Act, 1999, c. 26 (Eng.).
116 Addison & Siebert, supra note 99, at 440.
17 Id. at 440-41.
"8 Id. at 441.
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majority of the bargaining unit supports the union." 9 Otherwise, the CAC
arranges for a secret ballot election, whereby recognition is granted upon a
majority of those voting in favor, "providing that they constitute at least 40 per
cent [sic] of the bargaining unit."'12
The main difference between voluntary recognition and statutory
recognition as granted by the CAC is with regard to the status of recognition.
If the employer chooses to voluntarily recognize the union, recognition may be
withdrawn at any time without penalty. 12' Under the statutory scheme, the
employer may not unilaterally withdraw recognition, thereby, creating a higher
status of recognition. 122 Consequently, an increase in the number of voluntary
recognitions has been an unforeseen result of this statutory scheme. 21 Since
voluntary recognition affords the employer some leeway to terminate the
agreement if business dictates that need, it may be a more attractive
alternative. 24 Also, the employer may use voluntary recognition as a tactic;
the employer may choose to voluntarily recognize a union that it finds more
palatable, rather than be statutorily required to recognize a union that is less
so.
125
Should the employer choose not to voluntarily recognize the union,
however, the British statutory scheme, like the U.S. system, provides the
employer ample time to campaign against the union. The employer is first
given ten working days in which to respond to a request for recognition from
the union.126 Should the employer refuse the request, the union may apply to
the CAC for statutory recognition; the CAC then has ten working days in
which to decide if the application is admissible. 27 If it is admissible, the
parties are granted twenty days to come to terms on the appropriate bargaining
unit. 12  If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the CAC takes an
additional ten days to determine the appropriate bargaining unit.'29 If the CAC
119 Id.
120 Id.
12' BOWERS, Q.C. ET AL., supra note 112, at 304. Even if there is an agreement to provide
a notice period prior to withdrawal or if recognition is to last for a specified time, there are no
legal consequences of an employer's withdrawal of recognition unless the agreement expressly
states that it intends to be legally binding. Id. at 304-05.
122 Id. at 305.
23 Id. at 305-06 (citing a study that reported three times as many voluntary recognition
agreements in 2001 than in 2000).
124 See id.
121 Id. at 305.
126 Id. at 321.
127 Id. at 325. There may be additional time spent on a hearing if the conditions of
admissibility are questionable. Id.
128 Id. at 339. An extension may be granted if deemed necessary. Id.
129 Id. at 340.
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determines that a majority of those in the bargaining unit support the union, it
will issue a declaration of recognition.'3" However, if the CAC cannot detect
majority support for the union, it will order an election. 3' The CAC then
appoints a qualified independent person (QIP), who is ordered to administer
the ballot within twenty days of her appointment. 1
32
The British statutory recognition scheme has the potential to consume far
more time than the U.S. system and, certainly, more than the Canadian card
check system. Unlike the U.S. system, however, the British employer has an
express duty to afford the union "such access to the workers .. .[in] the
bargaining unit as is reasonable to enable the union (or unions) to inform the
workers of the object of the ballot and to seek their support and their opinions
on the issues involved."' 33 There is no such duty placed on U.S. employers
under the NLRA.'
Additionally, by promoting voluntary recognition, the British scheme
eliminates the campaign period in certain instances. Since the statutory
scheme was proposed, there has been a growth of new recognition deals in the
United Kingdom. For example, in 2001, there were 518 new full recognition
agreements, whereas in 1997, when Blair took office, there were only seventy
full recognition agreements.'
These figures, in conjunction with a relatively low number of reported
incidents of employer anti-union behavior during the same period, suggest that
employer anti-union behavior during the organization campaign period is not
as significant a factor in the United Kingdom as it is in the United States. 13 6
For instance, one study found only six hundred instances of anti-union
behavior during British recognition campaigns from 1995 to 2001.137 This rate
is startlingly low compared to the number of unfair labor practices filed yearly
with the NLRB.13 8 Scholars predict, however, that British employers will be
130 Id. at 351.
131 Id. at 353. The parties are then granted an additional ten-day notification period. Id.
132 Id. at 355-56.
131 Id. at 356-57. The Code of Practice of the Department of Trade and Industry recommends
that employers allow a thirty minute union meeting in the workplace every ten days of the
campaign period, and that employees should be allowed to meet with union representatives on
premises during working hours. Id. at 357-58.
"' See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.LR.B. 400,409 (1953) (holding that an employer can
give captive audience speeches to employees during the organization campaign without giving
equal time and access to the union).
13' Gregor Gall, Introduction, in UNION ORGANIZING: CAMPAIGNING FOR TRADE UNION
RECOGNITION 11 (Gregor Gall ed., 2003).
136 Gregor Gall, Employer Opposition to Union Recognition, in UNION ORGANIZING:
CAMPAIGNING FOR TRADE UNION RECOGNITION 92 (Gregor Gall ed., 2003).
137 Id.
131 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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more likely to engage in anti-union behavior in the future because the bulk of
the instances of anti-union behavior recorded in the study occurred in the
period of 1998-2001, during the rise and inception of the Employment
Relations Act 1999.39 Also, a significant number of companies from the
United States, or owned by Americans, are listed among those that engaged in
anti-union behavior during the recognition period.40 It seems that the
American tendency to vigorously campaign against union organization has
"crossed the pond." Given the incentives for voluntary recognition and the
liberal access rules embedded in British labor law, this practice may never
reach the magnitude it has in the United States.
C. The Numbers Game: Union Density Rates and Wage Differentials
Although the Canadian and British union recognition systems are more
favorable to unions in terms of policy and procedure than the U.S. system,
unionization rates have receded in the United Kingdom and remain relatively
low in Canada, despite the fact that union members are paid consistently
higher wages than nonunion workers. This anomaly indicates that changing
the way unions are recognized in the United States may not be sufficient to halt
union membership fallout.
According to the Canadian Department of Human Resources and Skills
Development, union density 4 ' rose in 2004 to 30.7% from 30.4% the year
before.'42 Actual union membership increased by 120,000 members from the
year before; however, the number of non-agricultural paid workers also rose
by 234,000, explaining the meager increase in union density. Unlike
Canada, the U.S. union density rate remained stable, but low, at 12.5% for both
2004 and 2005.'" While, in the United Kingdom, union density declined in
2004.14' According to the British Department of Trade and Industry, union
density fell in 2004 from 29.3% the year before to 28.8%.46
139 Gall, supra note 136, at 93.
140 Id.
141 Union density is "the percentage of non-agricultural wage and salary employees.., who
are union members." Barry T. Hirsch et al., Estimates of Union Density by State, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., July 2001, at 51, 51, available at www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/07/ressum2.pdf.
142 WORKPLACE INFO. DIRECTORATE, LABOUR PROGRAM, HUMAN RES. DEV. CANADA, UNION
MEMBERSHIP IN CANADA-JANUARY 1,2005, available at http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/wid/union
_membership.shtml.
143 Id.
144 BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., supra note 3, at 1.
141 DEP'T OFTRADEANDINDUS., TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 2004, at I (Apr. 2005), http://
www.dti.gov.uk/er/emar/tradeunion-membership2004.pdfpubpdfload=05%2F857.
146 Id.
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While union density rates have remained low, unionized workers in all
three nations continue to receive wages that exceed those of nonunion workers.
In January 2006, the average hourly earnings of a unionized full-time worker
in Canada were $22.63, 24.1% more than the $18.24 paid to nonunion
workers.147 In 2004, the average hourly earnings of a U.K. union member were
£11.38, 17.1% more than the £9.72 per hour paid to the average nonunion
worker.'48 In the United States, where the median weekly wage of union
members was $801, as opposed to the $622 paid to nonunion workers, union
workers earned 28.8% more than nonunion workers in 2005.141
In the United States, the decline in union density may be directly related to
these wage differentials because the threat of higher wages provides an
incentive to employers to attempt to preserve their profit margins by quashing
unionization.
The United States decides union membership through an
adversarial electoral process at plant level, which has evolved
into a system where management has a greater say in
unionization outcomes than it does in other countries. The
benefit to employers in removing unions from the workplace
often outweighs the costs of doing so. 50
Indeed, a 1988 study showed a positive correlation between the union wage
gap and managerial opposition to unions via the number of unfair labor
practices committed per worker during NLRB elections.' 5'
Other factors that contribute to union decline are "more competitive
product markets, increased international trade and a favourable [sic] legal
environment, as a result of which there have been smaller economic rents to
147 STAT. CANADA, AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES OF EMPLOYEES BY SELECTED
CHARACTERISTICS AND PROFESSION (2005), available at http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst0l/
labr69a.htm.
148 DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDus., supra note 145, at 9 (noting that these estimates "fail to
adjust for ... characteristics, such as age and education levels").
"' BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., supra note 3, at 3 (noting possible influences on the wage
differential other than collective bargaining agreements, such as "variations in the distributions
of union members and nonunion employees by occupation, industry, firm size, or geographic
region").
Is0 David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, Changes over Time in Union Relative Wage
Effects in the UK and the US Revisited, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 197,
220-21 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003).
"' Id. at 221 (citing Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of
Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 63-88
(1988)).
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be shared with workers than was true in the past." '152 Also, as technology
advances, fewer workers are needed to complete the same job. In the high
premium industries, wages may have increased while employment has
decreased, thus reducing union membership. '53 These factors may also account
for union decline or status quo, despite high union wage premiums, in Canada
and the United Kingdom.
Although it would seem that higher wage premiums would increase demand
for union representation, that has not been the case. Rather, the increased
differentials have been referred to as "a major liability to the future
development of unionism"'54 in the United States because they serve as a
further incentive for management to resist union recognition campaigns and
card check agreements. Ultimately, changing the union recognition system in
the United States will not, by itself, increase union membership. 155
V. FURTHERING FREE CHOICE: ALTERNATIVES BEYOND AND BESIDE THE
EFCA
Given that union density has declined in the United Kingdom, despite
voluntary recognition, and has remained nearly static in Canada, despite the
card check system used in half of the provinces, other alternatives to union
recognition and to labor relations in general may be more effective in
increasing union membership in the United States than card check legislation,
alone.
First, local and state legislatures should mandate employer neutrality during
union campaigns by placing spending restrictions on government funds allotted
to businesses. For instance, in California, employers who receive state funds
are prohibited from using those stipends to "assist, promote or deter union
organizing."' 56 Similar legislation has been proposed in at least eighteen states
and has passed in New York and Massachusetts.' 57
1' Blanchflower & Bryson, supra note 150, at 221.
153 Id.
154 Id.
"s The EFCA does propose additional measures beyond enforcing card check recognition,
such as raising the penalties for committing unfair labor practices. S. 842, 109th Cong. § 4(b)
(2005).
156 CAL. GOv'T CODE § 16645.2(a) (Deering 2005). The Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals held
that this law was preempted by the NLRA in Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 422 F.3d 973,
977 (9th Cir. 2005), however, the case will be reheard en banc. 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1029
(9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2006).
"' Bradley W. Kampas & Scott Oborne, Ninth Circuit Strikes Down California Union-
Neutrality Legislation, 4-6 BENDER'S LAB. & EMP. BuLL. 2 (2004).
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By ensuring employer neutrality, these laws provide impetus to unions
during elections campaigns. For instance, a 1999 study by the AFL-CIO found
that unions with neutrality agreements win 84% of secret ballot elections,
whereas unions without neutrality agreements win only 50% of secret ballot
elections. 58 Given the statistical advantage of neutrality agreements, state
legislation supporting neutrality agreements is an option worth pursuing.
A second option is the nonmajority bargaining order (NMBO), a remedy
that would be issued only in cases where the employer has committed
egregious unfair labor practices. The issuance of an NMBO would force the
employer to bargain with the union despite the fact that there is "no objective
evidence of majority support for a union"'59 by the bargaining unit. Currently,
the NLRB refuses to issue an NMBO under any circumstance,160 although they
have in the past. 161
At issue is whether the Board has the authority to impose an NMBO
because such authority may be expressly denied by the NLRA. 62 Section 9(a)
of the NLRA states that "representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees... shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees."'' 63 This majority principle,
however, is not sacrosanct. For example, the NLRB presumes that a union has
the support of the majority of the bargaining unit for a year after it is certified
or voluntarily recognized."6 The presumption is justified because it "furthers
the [NLRA]'s fundamental policy of encouraging collective bargaining.
Similarly, although NMBOs technically may compromise the majority
principle, they are justified because they further the [NLRA]'s fundamental
policy of protecting employees' rights to select freely their collective
bargaining representatives."'' 65
' Id. Accordingly, the defeat of the California law in the Court of Appeals was hailed as "an
enormous victory for employers [that] . . . will likely have far reaching implications and
consequences." Id.
"59 David S. Shillman, Note, Nonmajority Bargaining Orders: The Only Effective Remedy
for Pervasive Employer Unfair Labor Practices During Union Organizing Campaigns, 20 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 617, 618 (1987).
160 See Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 585 (1984) (concluding "that nonmajority
bargaining order remedies are not within [the Board's] remedial discretion").
61 See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981); Conair Corp., 261
N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), rev'd, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
162 Shillman, supra note 159, at 622.
163 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
"6 Shillman, supra note 159, at 623. As of this writing, the NLRB is set to reconsider
whether the election year bar applies to a union that is voluntarily recognized. Susan J.
McGolrick, NLRB Poised to Decide Important Cases with Three-Member Republican Majority,
10 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at S-Il (Jan. 17, 2006).
165 Shillman, supra note 159, at,623-24.
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Since NMBOs would be granted only in cases of extremely coercive
employer behavior, such as discriminatory discharges or persistent threats of
reprisal, concerns over the infringement of the maj ority principle are somewhat
abated.'66 The granting of NMBOs may be further restricted by a requirement
of a minimum showing of union support.16' Given employers' reliance on
illegal discharges to quash union fervor in the bargaining unit, 168 NMBOs
would play an important role in deterring such behavior and may offer the
potential for greater union success during recognition elections.
A third option is to statutorily decrease the delay between the approval of
the election petition and the actual election. 169 In the Canadian province of
Nova Scotia, for example, the election must take place within five days of
election approval. 70 Nova Scotia uses "a double envelope system so that any
ballot that may be challenged on the basis of employee ineligibility can be
identified."'71 Also, the provincial Board's notification of election is posted
at the workplace, so that employees will be aware of the process.'72 Beyond
limiting the duration and, hence, the amount of pressure the employer can
apply to persuade eligible workers to vote against the union, this method also
provides an assurance to the employer that the bargaining unit has "freely
chosen" union representation.'73 This method, then, offers legitimacy to the
union that card checks may not."'
By statutorily guaranteeing the viability of card checks during the
recognition stage, the EFCA takes the first step toward ensuring workers a fair
and informed decision on union representation. There are other measures,
however, that would supplement and further that goal. "
166 Id.
161 Id. at 632-33 (suggesting a threshold of 30% of the bargaining unit's authorization cards
signed "prior to the employer's unfair labor practice").
168 See discussion supra Part II.B.
169 Brudney, supra note 8, at 879.
170 Murphy, supra note 46, at 88. A secret ballot election with a condensed campaign period
is the accepted method of union recognition in three other Canadian provinces. See Brudney,
supra note 8, at 879.
'7' Murphy, supra note 46, at 88.
172 Id. at 88-89.
'" Id. at 88.
114 See discussion supra Part III.
"' Beyond the legal framework, unions must take it upon themselves to instill the Labor
Movement with new relevance and dynamism in the current climate of "[d]eregulation,
technological advances, and foreign competition [that] have transformed the economic realities
in U.S. product and labor markets." Brudney, supra note 8, at 875. Perhaps the Change to Win
Federation will make significant advances toward that goal. See supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the advantages of unionization, including higher wages, better
benefits, job security, improved safety and health standards at the workplace,
and an overall higher quality of living, union density continues its precipitous
decline in the United States. This decline has been attributed, among other
things, to globalization, which has depleted the American manufacturing
industry. 17 6 Union membership, however, has also fallen in the service
industries.'77  Global pressures, as well as "deregulation, heightened
competition, and cheap immigrant labor have forced employers into a ceaseless
struggle" to minimize costs, including wages and employee benefits. '78 In this
climate, American workers are bearing the losses as their paychecks have
withered after the gains of the 1990s, company-paid health coverage has
diminished, and anxiety aboutjob security has intensified as more white-collar
jobs are shipped overseas.179 Given the global pressures to sustain
profitability, employers and the attorneys who advise them take the position
that it is not in their interest to recognize a union.8 0
Hence, employers "pull out the stops when labor organizers appear, using
everything from mandatory antiunion meetings to staged videos showing
alleged union thugs beating workers, backed by streams of leaflets and letters
to workers' homes."'' As this Note has shown, employers have also
increasingly resorted to the illegal tactic of discriminatory discharge.
Although redress is available, it is often delayed.'82 Employers typically view
the penalties as paltry, relative to the potential costs of unionization.8 3
The EFCA attempts to correct this power imbalance, which is effectuated
by the current version of the NLRA. The EFCA proposes to stiffen the
penalties for illegal discharges in an attempt to limit the success of this tactic
against unionization. Furthermore, the EFCA intends to amend the NLRA to
require employers to recognize unions when they are presented with
authorization cards signed by a majority of the appropriate bargaining unit,
rather than resort to a secret ballot election. This provision would virtually
eliminate the lengthy campaign period between the election petition and the
176 Bernstein, supra note 39, at 82.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 82-83.
so Id. at 83.
181 Id.
182 See Morris, supra note 59, at 338.
'83 Id. at 343.
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election itself. Thus, it would severely restrict the potential for employer
coercion and intimidation, which often takes place during that period.
The EFCA is based on the system of recognition prevalent in many
Canadian provinces, where card checks are presumptively valid proof of the
bargaining unit's desire for union representation. However, union density
remains low in Canada, despite this seemingly more fair and free system.
Similarly, union density has declined in the United Kingdom under the current
statutory scheme that promotes voluntary recognition over secret ballot
elections.
Ultimately, it is not likely that card check legislation, such as that proposed
by the EFCA, would result in a surge in union membership in the United
States. Alternatives examined here, either alone or in conjunction with card
check legislation, may be more effective in affording employees a free choice
when exercising their rights to join a union, and in deterring employers'
coercive strategies that would confound free choice.
